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Usually, groups increase their productivity by the specialization of their group members. In 
these cases, group output is no longer simply a sum of individual outputs. We analyze 
contests with group-specific public goods that allow for different degrees of complementarity 
between group members’ efforts. More specifically, we use a Tullock contest success function 
and a CES-impact function. We show that in equilibrium the degree of complementarity is 
irrelevant if groups do not differ in size and group members have an identical valuation of the 
public good. The equilibrium is discontinuous as the CES function converges to the Cobb-
Douglas case. Except for the effects at the discontinuity, higher complementarity tends to 
favor larger groups. In groups with diverse valuations, higher complementarity also leads to 
higher similarity in group members’ efforts, which however is not necessarily an advantage 
for a more diverse group. 
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 1 Introduction
With only a few exceptions, the literature on group contests1 has focused attention
on impact functions2 that are additively separable in the eﬀort levels of its mem-
bers. Additive separability of individual eﬀorts is an important starting point for
the analysis of group contests. However, it is clear that eﬀorts of diﬀerent group
members are incomplete substitutes in a number of examples. In R&D races, where
teams of researchers develop new technologies, the whole project is often divided
into diﬀerent, more or less complementary sub-projects that are carried out by dif-
ferent researchers. In military conﬂicts the armed forces are highly specialized and
often divided into complementary units. The same is true for the standard lobbying
case if representatives of diﬀerent ﬁrms or organizations lobbying for the same policy
diﬀer in qualiﬁcations and specialize accordingly. In sports contests, team members
are usually specialized with respect to qualiﬁcations that complement each other in
a non-additive way. This list of examples could be arbitrarily extended because the
mere idea of specialization implies that there is a certain degree of complementarity
in team or group production. Individuals diﬀer in talents, qualiﬁcations, and aﬀec-
tions such that we can expect that individuals in a group or team will specialize
to increase overall productivity. We can expect a certain degree of complementar-
ity between the eﬀorts of the group members. Alchian and Demsetz (1972) see the
non-additivity as constitutive for group or team production (pp. 777): “Resource
owners increase productivity through cooperative specialization. [...] With team pro-
duction it is diﬃcult, solely by observing total output, to either deﬁne or determine
each individual’s contribution to this output of the cooperating inputs. The output
is yielded by a team, by deﬁnition, and it is not a sum of separable outputs of each
of its members. [...] Usual explanations of the gains from cooperative behavior rely
on exchange and production in accord with the comparative advantage specialization
principle with separable additive production. However [...] there is a source of gain
from cooperative activity involving working as a team, wherein individual cooperating
inputs do not yield identiﬁable, separate products which can be summed to measure
the total output.”
1The literature on contests between groups has recently been surveyed by Corch´ on, 2007, Section
4.2, Garﬁnkel & Skaperdas, 2007, Section 7, and Konrad, 2009, Chapters 5.5 and 7.
2The term is deﬁned and discussed in M¨ unster (2009).
1If non-additive eﬀort is the rule rather than the exception, it is important to
understand how the degree of substitution between individual eﬀorts inﬂuences be-
havior in and the outcome of the contest. In this paper we analyze a situation where
eﬀorts of group members can be imperfect substitutes. In order to capture this idea,
we assume that individual eﬀorts xk
i are mapped onto group output (which itself




i)γ)1/γ, with variable elasticity of substitution 1/(1−γ), ranging from perfect
complements (γ → −∞) to perfect substitutes (γ → 1). The contest is of the Tullock
type, and the rent is a group-speciﬁc public good (i.e. nonrival in consumption).3
If groups instead of individuals compete in a contest, the well-known free-rider
problem among group members exists. Every individual bears the full costs of its
investments, whereas the beneﬁts partly spill over to the rest of the group (Katz,
Nitzan, & Rosenberg, 1990; Esteban & Ray, 2001; Epstein & Mealem, 2009; Nitzan
& Ueda, 2009). Depending on the sharing rule applied, this problem may also exist
for a private good (Nitzan, 1991a, 1991b; Esteban & Ray, 2001; Nitzan & Ueda,
2009). In the recent literature, Baik (2008), Epstein and Mealem (2009), and Lee
(2008) have presented contest models with group-speciﬁc public goods. A major
result in Baik (2008) is that in a model with linear eﬀort costs and additively linear
impact functions only those group members with the highest valuation of the rent
make positive investments in the contest. In his model, eﬀorts of group members are
perfect substitutes and therefore the optimality conditions given by the ﬁrst-order
conditions cannot hold for diﬀerent valuations. With several group members having
the maximal valuation among the group, there exist multiple equilibria, since the
ﬁrst order condition only deﬁnes the total eﬀort spent by the group. Epstein and
Mealem (2009) stick to the assumption of additive separability of individual eﬀort
in the group-production functions but introduce decreasing returns to investment.
Using a technology that fulﬁlls standard Inada conditions they show that every
individual makes positive investments. Their model is isomorphic to a model with
linear impact functions and in which individuals face strictly convex costs. In this
sense, eﬀort levels are no longer perfect substitutes, but the impact function is still
additively separable. Lee (2008) focuses attention on weakest-link impact functions.
The perfect complementarity of eﬀorts creates a coordination problem between group
members which gives rise to multiple equilibria, and the equilibrium with highest
3M¨ unster (2009) provides an axiomatic foundation for the Tullock function for group contests.
2eﬀorts is determined by the valuation of the player with minimum valuation within
each group. Hence, the models of Baik (2008) and Lee (2008) represent the “polar”
cases with respect to the elasticity of substitution between group members.4
Our model generalizes these results. It turns out that the equilibrium of our
model is unique for all values of γ ∈ {(−∞,0),(0,1)} (γ = 0 can only be covered by
a limit result). If there is no within-group heterogeneity with respect to valuations
of the prize and all groups have the same size, the equilibrium is independent of
the elasticity of substitution. This result is a useful starting point because it shows
that the elasticity of substitution per se has no impact on behavior in the contest:
contrary to the cursory idea that increasing the degree of complementarity between
group-members’ eﬀorts helps to internalize the existing free-rider problem.5 At the
same time, this result shows that the standard results on group contests are robust
with respect to variations in the elasticity of substitution under these assumptions.
An immediate implication of this irrelevance result is the conjecture that the
elasticity of substitution becomes relevant if there is heterogeneity between group
members with respect to the valuations of the rent and/or heterogeneity between
groups with respect to group size, if at all.
A ﬁrst important result of this general case is the characterization of active
and inactive groups. We know from Hillman and Riley (1987) and Stein (2002)
(for contests between individuals) that players may prefer not to participate in a
contest if valuations are suﬃciently heterogenous. This result carries over to the
case of group contests. However, if a group is active, every member of this group
exerts positive eﬀort. In addition, the equilibrium strategies are continuous (but not
necessarily continuously diﬀerentiable) in the elasticity of substitution everywhere
except at γ = 0, because groups that become inactive or active do this in a “smooth”
way.
The limit behavior of our model is of particular interest. First, the results for the
two limiting cases γ → 1 and γ → −∞ have been analyzed by Baik (1993, 2008) and
Lee (2008). In the former case, equilibrium eﬀort is determined by the players with
4One might argue that the best-shot technology where only the maximum eﬀort counts is even
more extreme, but it is relatively obvious that as for the case of perfect substitutes the equilibrium
with maximum eﬀort is also determined by the players with maximum valuations.
5Hirshleifer (1983) argues for the special case of perfect complements (“weakest-link” technol-
ogy) that the complementarity between group members’ eﬀorts helps solving the free-rider problem.
3the maximum valuations, and in the latter case by the players with the minimum
valuation in each group, which implies that group size does not matter. However,
there are multiple equilibria in both cases. We can show that our model is consistent
with both results in the sense that the equilibrium converges to one of the equilibria
of the boundary cases. As a consequence, the uniqueness of the equilibrium for all
values of γ except 1 and −∞ shows that the multiplicity problems are not robust
with respect to small changes in the elasticity of substitution.
For all other values of γ, relative group size is important for the resulting equi-
librium. This observation allows it to build a bridge to the discussion about the
so-called “group-size paradox” (Olson, 1965; Esteban & Ray, 2001; Nitzan & Ueda,
2009) that “larger groups may be less successful than smaller groups in furthering
their interests” (Esteban & Ray, 2001, p.663). We can show that the possible rever-
sal of the group-size paradox occurs also in our model if γ ∈ (0,1). In the limiting
case γ = 1, group size is irrelevant, and a reduction in the elasticity of substitution
helps the relatively large groups at the expense of the relatively small ones. In the
limit case γ → 0+ only the largest groups stay active, and if there is a single largest
group, it wins almost for sure, irrespective of its relative valuation of the rent. This
ﬁnding shows that the reversal of the group-size paradox is not restricted to suﬃ-
ciently convex cost functions (Esteban & Ray, 2001). A decrease in the elasticity of
substitution has the same eﬀect.
The fact that we have covered all possible elasticities of substitution allows it to
incorporate the discussion about the relative advantage of large or small groups into
a larger picture. For higher degrees of complementarity (γ < 0), we can show that the
advantage of larger groups is reversed as soon as γ turns negative. As γ approaches
0 from below, large groups become inactive, and in the limiting case we end up with
an arbitrarily large advantage of the smallest group. This discontinuity of the model
at γ = 0 is a consequence of the CES-impact function that increasingly leverages
diﬀerences in group size as γ approaches 0. However, smaller values of γ tend to help
larger groups also if γ < 0. Hence, if deviations from the perfect-substitutes case
are the rule rather than the exception for most empirical applications, there is no
immediate answer to the question of whether large or small groups have an advantage
in the contest. It depends on the strength of the complementarities. Coming back to
the discussion about free-riding and the degree of complementarity, the results on
relative group size show that in fact more complementary impact functions ceteris
4paribus help larger groups at the expense of smaller ones, and in this sense it helps
alleviating the free-rider problem that is more severe the larger the relative size of
the group.
The paper is organized as follows. We introduce the model in Section 2 and
start with introductory examples in Section 3. We characterize the simultaneous
Nash equilibrium of the general model in Section 4. In subsection 4.1 we will state
convergence results for γ approaching 1, 0, and −∞, and in subsection 4.2 the
comparative-static results are summarized. Section 5 concludes.
2 The model
Assume that n groups compete for a given rent R. mi is the number of individuals
in group i and k is the index of a generic member of this group. The rent is a
group-speciﬁc public good that has a value vk
i > 0 to individual k of group i, and
we assume the following ordering: vmax
i ≥ ... ≥ vmin
i . pi represents the probability
of group i = 1,...,n to win the contest. It is a function of some vector of aggregate
group output q1,...,qn. We focus on Tullock-form contest success functions where
the winning probability of a group i is deﬁned as:
Assumption 1: pi(q1,...,qn) =
qi  n
j=1 qj, i = 1,...n.
The aggregate group output depends on individual eﬀort xk




i = 1,...,n. Following the literature we will call qi(.) impact functions in the following








i)γ 1/γ, γ ∈ (−∞,1], i =
1,...n.
Note that we obtain a closed-form solution only if γ  = 0. The Cobb-Douglas case
γ → 0 will be covered by a limit result.
Assumption 3: Individuals are risk neutral, face linear costs, and max-
imize their net rent.




























i refers to the vector x1
1,...,xmn
n without xk
i. We are looking for a Nash
equilibrium of this game where individuals choose their eﬀort xk
i simultaneously to














where “∗” refers to equilibrium values.
3 Introductory examples
The explanatory variable that is new compared to the existing literature is the
elasticity of substitution. In this section we analyze three simple examples that
provide intuition for the relevance of this variable in contests. We will come back to
these examples throughout the main part of the paper to provide intuition for the
general results. As we will see, the elasticity is only relevant if the valuations between
members of the same group diﬀer or if groups diﬀer in size. All three examples restrict
attention to a contest between two groups, 1 and 2, with m1 and m2 members. The




i , i = 1,2. The
examples are chosen to highlight the central mechanisms of this model, we therefore
delegate all technical details about the existence of interior solutions, active and
inactive groups and group members, etc. to the next section.
The ﬁrst-order condition that characterizes an interior solution to the individual















− 1 = 0;k = L,H;i = 1,2, (3)
which is a simple “marginal revenues equal marginal costs” condition.
Example 1: In this example we restrict attention to groups of equal size m1 =
m2 = m with only a single valuation of the members of a given group, vmin
i =
vmax
i = vi,i = 1,2. We assume that all members of a given group behave identically.











− 1 = 0, i = 1,2,j  = i. (4)








investments in the contest are independent of γ. This example shows that the elas-
ticity of substitution does not play a role if there is no within-group heterogeneity
and groups are of equal size. The reason for this result is the combination of a
constant-return to scale impact function with a contest success function that is ho-
mogenous of degree zero. Conversely, it must be either within-group heterogeneity
and/or diﬀerences in group size that may cause behavioral changes due to changes
in γ. The next two examples show that this may in fact be the case.
Example 2: Second, we assume that v1 = v2 but allow for diﬀerences in group size.
































if all members of the same group behave identically. In this case, individual eﬀorts
depend on the size of the groups. As we will discuss in greater detail in Section 4.2,
this ﬁnding allows to perceive the discussion about the group-size paradox in a more
general and comprehensive way.
Example 3: In the last example we assume that m1 = m2 but vmin
1 = vmin
2 =
vmin ≤ vmax = vmax
1 = vmax
2 . The population is divided into mmin = mmax = m/2

























As in the second example, γ may inﬂuence the outcome of the game if diﬀerences
among the valuations of the rent among the group members exist.
74 The general case
We now turn to the analysis of the general case. In order to have a lean notation,
let yk
i = (xk
i)γ and Yi = (
 
l yl
















Qi + Q/i in the following. While deriving the equilibrium strategies, we will omit
the parameters of these functions for better readability (e.g yk
i instead of yk
i (γ,xk
i)).
Hillman and Riley (1987) and Stein (2002) have shown that groups/individuals may
prefer to stay inactive if the size of all groups is equal to 1. Baik (2008) has shown
that only group members with maximum valuation participate in a contest. Hence,
it is possible that some individuals and/or groups will stay inactive in our setup.
We therefore start with an analysis of active individuals and groups.
Deﬁnition 1: An individual k of group i is said to participate if xk
i > 0. A group
i is said to participate if there exists some k such that xk
i > 0. A group is said to
fully participate if ∀k : xk
i > 0.
Lemma 1: In a Nash equilibrium of a contest fulﬁlling Assumptions 1, 2, and 3 if
a group participates, it fully participates.
The proof of this as well as the next Lemma can be found in the appendix.
Lemma 1 implies that in order to determine whether an individual participates, it is









Without loss of generality, suppose the groups are ordered such that Vi(γ) ≥ Vi+1(γ)
for a given γ. Q∗
i(γ) and Q∗(γ) shall denote Qi and Q in equilibrium. The following
Lemma determines the groups that participate in equilibrium.
Lemma 2: a) There exist best response strategies of the members of a group, if and
only if the following group best response function is fulﬁlled:







b) Groups 1...n∗(γ) participate, where n∗(γ) ≡ argmaxi i such that Vi(γ) > Q∗(γ).
c) If the Nash equilibrium is unique, Q∗
i(γ) and Q∗(γ) are continuous functions for
γ  = 0.
Lemma 2.c is useful for the comparative-static analysis. Given that the number
and identity of active groups depends on γ, it is a priori not clear that aggregate
eﬀort and indirect utilities are continuous in γ. The Lemma reveals that continuity
is in fact guaranteed except at γ = 0. The economic intuition is as follows: Assume
8that ˆ γ is a point where a formerly active group becomes inactive or a formerly
inactive group becomes active. The aggregate group eﬀort of the active group is
continuously reduced to zero as γ approaches ˆ γ, and the formerly inactive group
continuously increases its eﬀort from 0 as γ increases from ˆ γ. Hence, there is a
“smooth” fade out or fade in of groups at those points.
The following proposition characterizes the unique Nash equilibrium of the game.
For readability, the strategies xk
i are deﬁned as functions of Q∗(γ) and Vi(γ).
Proposition 1. The unique Nash equilibrium of the game characterized by Assump-























1−γ , Vi(γ) > Q∗(γ)





i=1 Vi(γ)−1 and n∗(γ) is deﬁned in Lemma 2.a and groups are
ordered such that Vi(γ) ≥ Vi+1(γ).






With an explicit solution for Q∗(γ), we can now determine individual expenditures
xk
i
∗(γ) by solving equation (7) using (9). The participation condition of a group is
given by Lemma 2, while Lemma 1 ensures that there does not exist an incentive for
any group member to deviate to xk
i = 0. It was further shown that the ﬁrst-order
conditions return local maxima. Since the system of equations given by the ﬁrst-
order conditions of the participating groups has a unique solution this is indeed the
unique Nash equilibrium.
A focal special case has equal group size mi = m∀i and no intra-group hetero-
geneity vk
i = vi∀k∀i. The following corollary of Proposition 1 can then be established.
Corollary 1: If mi = m∀i and vk
i = vi∀k∀i the equilibrium eﬀorts are independent
of γ.
Proof. Inserting mi = m∀i and vk





xj)∀i, which is independent of γ.
9The corollary shows that the elasticity of substitution is only relevant if there is
either heterogeneity with respect to valuations within groups and/or heterogeneity
with respect to group size. In all other cases equilibrium behavior does not depend on
γ. This ﬁnding implies that an increase in complementarity between group members’
eﬀort per se has no eﬀect on the within-group free-rider problem, as could have been
conjectured from Hirshleifer (1983). A further implication of the result is that the
results on group contests that have been derived in the literature for the case of
perfect substitutes or perfect complements carry over to arbitrary elasticities of
substitution if groups diﬀer only in their valuations of the rent.
4.1 Convergence Results
Before we move on to the core convergence results with respect to γ and the com-
parative statics of the model, let us ﬁrst note that the winning probability of group











which can be derived from (7). We will now state convergence results where γ ap-
proaches 1, 0, and −∞.




































































Proposition 2 shows that for γ increasing towards one, the group members with
lower valuations will decrease their eﬀorts towards zero, and only the group members
with the highest valuations contribute. If there is more than one individual with the
10highest valuation, we converge to an equilibrium where those individuals contribute
equally.6
Next we will analyze the other boundary case when γ approaches −∞. In order
to have a lean notation we denote limγ→−∞ f(γ) by f(−∞) for all functions f(.):






























i (γ) = 1
mi



























The results follow directly from the determination of the limit of (8).
Proposition 3 b) shows that (as expected given the results by Lee (2008)) all
group members participate with equal amounts. In this sense, for γ near −∞, we
obtain similar results as for a min(...) impact function. However, this function
creates multiple equilibria with an associated equilibrium-selection problem. Given
the uniqueness of equilibria for all ﬁnite γ, our limit result can be interpreted as
an equilibrium-selection mechanism where individual contributions depend on the
harmonic mean of the valuations.
Next we look at the limit behavior for γ → 0. It turns out that we have to consider
γ → 0+ and γ → 0− separately because the problem may not be continuous at this
point.
Proposition 4. Suppose ∀i : mi ≥ mi+1. For γ → 0+, we obtain:
a) If n∗ is either deﬁned by m1 =     = mn∗ > mn∗+1 with n∗ ≥ 2, or by





   
   
(n∗−1)vk
i
n∗2mi , m1 = m2 = mi =     = mn∗
0, m1 > m2 = mi =     = mn∗
0, mi > m2 ≥ ...
6In this latter case we get multiple equilibria if γ = 1 with the property that the sum of con-
tributions is always identical (Baik, 2008). In this sense, our convergence result can be interpreted












d) limγ→0+ Q∗(γ) =

     
     




















   
   
= 0, m1 > mi
= 1/n∗, m1 = mi =     = mn∗
= 1, mi > m2 ≥ ...
.
Proposition 5. Suppose ∀i : mi ≤ mi+1. For γ → 0−, we obtain:
a) If n∗ is either deﬁned by m1 =     = mn∗ < mn∗+1 with n∗ ≥ 2, or by





   
   
(n∗−1)vk
i
n∗2mi , m1 = m2 = mi =     = mn∗
0, m1 < m2 = mi =     = mn∗





























   
   
= 0, m1 > mi
= 1/n∗, m1 = mi =     = mn∗
= 1, mi < m2 ≥ ...
.
The proofs to these two propositions can be found in the appendix. In part a) of
each proposition the participating groups are deﬁned. For γ → 0+, only the largest,
while for γ → 0−, only the smallest groups participate in the contest (in both cases
there always remain at least two groups). Unless there exist groups with equal sizes
(which are maximal for the convergence from above, and minimal for the convergence
from below), individual eﬀorts always approach zero. Further, e) shows the winning
probabilities of the groups: the largest (respectively smallest for convergence from
below) groups have equal probabilities of winning, while any group smaller (larger)
has zero probability of winning in equilibrium, d) tells us that and Q∗(γ) converges to
inﬁnity if γ converges from above and there is no group of size 1 which participates
12in the contest. These results show that the behavior around γ = 0 is crucially
determined by the relative size of the groups. This property has a resemblance to
the results on the so-called “group-size paradox”, i.e. the apparent disadvantage of
larger groups compared to smaller ones (Esteban & Ray, 2001; Olson, 1965). To
obtain a proper intuition for this resemblance it is helpful to return to Example 2.
Example 2 continued: Coming back to Example 2 from Section 3, (5) can be used






























































1, m1 < m2





0, m1 < m2
1, m1 > m2
,
and analogously for p2(m1,m2,γ). Figure 1 shows p1(m1,m2,γ) (dashed line) and
p2(m1,m2,γ) (solid line) for the case m1 > m2. We will focus on p1(m1,m2,γ) in
the following. The graph starts at 0.5 at γ = 1. This is the well-known case where
group size has no impact on the winning probability (Baik, 2008). p1(m1,m2,γ)
steadily rises to 1 as γ converges to 0. At this point it jumps to 0 and increases
to 0.5 again as γ converges to −∞. In this case, group-size again does not matter
because only the minimum contribution counts (Lee, 2008). In order to understand
the economic intuition for this result, it makes sense to highlight the similarity of
our problem to the problem analyzed by Esteban and Ray (2001). They found that
the group-size paradox need not hold in a contest-environment and may be reversed
to yield an advantage for large groups if the costs of eﬀort are suﬃciently convex.
This result has a counterpart in our model if γ ∈ (0,1). Reducing γ in this interval
increasingly improves the position of the larger group. In the limit, the larger group
can win the contest with probability close to one as γ approaches zero. A reduction








Figure 1: Equilibrium probabilities for diﬀerent values of γ (m1 = 11, m2 = 10).














Figure 2: Eﬀort levels (left) and impacts (right) for diﬀerent values of γ.
in the elasticity of substitution has a similar eﬀect as an increase in the convexity
of the costs-of eﬀort function. Interestingly, if γ < 0, the smaller group starts with
an advantage as γ → 0−, but reducing γ again has the same eﬀect. In this case,
the group-size paradox does not only exist but is intensiﬁed by the technological
properties of the impact function. Hence, a steady change in γ at 0 has a dramatic
inﬂuence on the outcome of the game if the impact functions are of the CES form.
To better understand this property it makes sense to have a closer look at (5).
The left panel of Figure 2 shows x1(m1,m2,γ,v) and x2(m1,m2,γ,v) as functions
of γ for m1 > m2. The dashed graph is x1(m1,m2,γ,v) and the solid graph is
x2(m1,m2,γ,v). As could have been expected, individuals of the smaller group invest
14more. However, this does not translate into group impact, as can be seen from the
right panel of Figure 2. In this ﬁgure, the dashed graph is q1(m1,m2,γ,v) and the
solid graph is q2(m1,m2,γ,v). First of all, the impact technology translates group
1’s eﬀorts into an increasing advantage with respect to impact as γ → 0+. That
is, even though individual eﬀorts of group 1 are below those of group 2, q1 > q2
As soon as γ is turning negative, the impact-advantage passes over to group 2.
It follows also from Figure 2 that eﬀort converges to zero as γ approaches zero.
This follows from a speciﬁc property of the CES-impact function: If all members of
the same group exert identical eﬀort, qi(xi) = m
1/γ
i xi holds7. The equation shows
that in case that γ → 0+ the impact of the group increases even if group size and
eﬀort remains constant. Hence, eﬀort goes to zero because the groups are becoming
inﬁnitely productive. The opposite is true for γ → 0−: the impact of the group
decreases even if group size and eﬀort remains constant. Eﬀort goes to zero because
the groups are becoming inﬁnitely unproductive. End of Example 2.
If we follow Alchian and Demsetz (1972) and see a certain degree of comple-
mentarity in eﬀort as constitutive for a group problem, Proposition 3 and the above
discussion have important implications for our perception of the relevance of rela-
tive group size. The discussion about the existence of a “small-group advantage”
or a “large-group advantage” crucially depends on the degree of complementarity
between group-members eﬀorts. Hence, we do not have any a priori reason to believe
in the existence of such an advantage.
4.2 Comparative statics
We now turn to the comparative-static analysis of the inﬂuence of the elasticity of
substitution on the behavior in the contest using the approach developed by Cornes
and Hartley (2005). Most interestingly, individual valuations in relation to the val-
uations of the other group members deﬁne the individuals’ share of the amount of
eﬀort spent by the group, xk
i
∗/X∗
i . The valuation of other groups have no eﬀect on
these shares. As was to be expected, a larger elasticity of substitution γ increases
ceteris paribus the dispersion of these shares, since the exponent discriminates more




i )γ)1/γ  m
(γ−1)/γ
i . This however leads to a function that no longer converges to the min(...)
function if γ → −∞, which we desire here. Such a normalized impact function may however be of
interest elsewhere.
15strongly between diﬀerences in valuations. The next proposition states the eﬀect of




























at a point where the participating groups remain the same.
















































1−γ and rearranging yields the above condition.
The proposition implies that for all group members with a valuation above the
weighted geometric mean, the share of total group eﬀort increases with γ. The result
shows that the dispersion of valuations plays a crucial role for the comparative-static
eﬀects of γ. To get a better intuition for this result we return to Example 3.
Example 3 continued: If the game is symmetric between groups but group mem-
bers diﬀer in their valuation of the rent, we have seen in (6) that γ may inﬂuence the
behavior in the contest. Figure 3 shows how a change in the within-group disper-
sion of valuations vmax −vminL inﬂuences behavior, and we have assumed that this
change is a mean-preserving spread of the form dvmax = −dvmin, where dvmax,dvmin
are changes in the valuation of the rent such that the average income of the group
remains unchanged. The dashed lines correspond to vmax whereas the solid lines cor-
respond to vmin. Lines A and D correspond to a large spread vmax − vmin and lines
B and C correspond to a small spread vmax−vmin. First of all, the ﬁgure shows that
as γ converges to 1 the equilibrium converges to the Baik (2008) case where only the
high-valuation types contribute. In addition, a reduction in the spread vmax − vmin
reduces the maximum, which implies that B converges to a smaller value than A. At
the opposite side, if γ converges to −∞, we approximate the result by Lee (2008):
Both, xmin and xmax converge to the same value that is determined by the har-
monic mean of the valuations in the group. A reduction in the spread of valuations













Figure 3: Eﬀort levels for diﬀerent values of γ for a high and a low spread of valua-
tions.
vmax−vmin increases the harmonic mean, which implies that B and C converge to a
higher level than A and D. For the intermediate values of γ we get a steady increase
in xmax and a steady decrease in xmin as γ increases. In the limit case vmax = vmin
this line would be straight. End of Example 3.
It has been impossible to derive general results for the eﬀect of γ on winning
probabilities Q∗
i(γ)/Q∗(γ) and the total impact Q∗(γ). However, it is possible to
generate further insight in the important case where all individuals in the same
group have the same evaluation (vk
i = vi). This separates the eﬀect of the dispersion
of the valuations the group members have from the eﬀect of the group size and the
total valuation the group has. The results are summarized in the next proposition.
Proposition 7. Let γ  = 0. a) Assume that vk
i = vi ∀i,k and ∃i s.t. mi > 1, then
Q∗(γ) is strictly decreasing in γ.
b) Assume that vk


























17c) Assume that vk




























Proof. Taking the derivative of (9) with respect to γ where the participating groups























Therefore, for a given set of participating groups, total eﬀort is decreasing in γ unless
mi = 1 ∀i. From Lemma 2 we know that total eﬀort is a continuous function in γ
if γ  = 0, that a group that is becoming inactive for some γ fades out smoothly.
Total eﬀort can thus be expressed as a continuous, piecewise strictly decreasing
function, which is a strictly decreasing function as well. Note again that Q∗(γ) may
be discontinuous at γ = 0 and thus the results only hold below and above this
discontinuity. This establishes part a) of the proposition.
Similarly, if all individuals within one group are identical (vk




































from which part c) of the proposition can be obtained by the fact that the last term
in brackets determines the sign of the total derivative because we again know from
Lemma 2 that total eﬀort is a continuous function in γ if γ  = 0. Setting vi = v ∀i
then yields part b).
Part a) of the proposition states that under the assumption that all individuals
within each group are identical, the total impact of all groups into the contest success
function is decreasing in γ. For the intuition underlying part b), suppose we make
the further simplifying assumption that there are only two groups i and j. It follows
that ∂(Q∗
i(γ)/Q∗(γ))/∂γ is negative if and only if mi > mj: The free-rider problem
is intensiﬁed by larger values of γ for larger groups. If investments within a group
become less complementary, the larger group suﬀers more from weaker incentives.
18Hence, its relative share of impact and thereby winning probability goes down. This
property can be nicely seen in Figure 1 where the winning probability of the larger
group is decreasing for all values of γ  = 0. The ﬁgure and the above analysis also
show that this result has to be interpreted with caution because of the potential
discontinuity of pi at γ = 0. The same logic carries over to the case of more than
two groups. However, the relative standing of group i then depends on the weighted
geometric mean of all group sizes, as established in part c) of the proposition.





∂γ = 0 if mi = m even for
diﬀering valuations for all i, which follows immediately from c). This corresponds to
Corollary 1 and Example 1. In general, c) captures the eﬀect of γ if the valuations
diﬀer between, but not within groups. The eﬀort share of a homogenous group de-
creases in γ whenever the number of group members is above the valuation-weighted
geometric average of group members across all groups.
5 Concluding Remarks
This paper has started from the observation that group eﬀort can in general not be
additively decomposed into some sum (of functions) of individual eﬀorts. The use of
a CES-impact function has allowed to identify the main channels of inﬂuence of the
elasticity of substitution on the behavior in and the outcome of contests. If groups
are of equal size and homogenous (i.e. all group members have the same valuation
within the group), the elasticity of substitution does not matter. For heterogenous
groups, the higher the complementarity of eﬀorts, the lower the divergence of eﬀorts
among group members. As we have seen in Example 3, this does not necessarily
lead to an advantage of the group with more diverse valuations. If all groups are
homogenous but diﬀer in size and valuations, we were able to state the eﬀect of
the elasticity of substitution on the winning probabilities of a group. Except for
the discontinuity at the Cobb-Douglas case (γ = 0), higher complementarity tends
to favor large groups. Near the discontinuity, small groups are at an advantage for
γ < 0, while for γ > 0, large groups are at an advantage. In both cases, if there is a
single largest (smallest) group, their advantage will become inﬁnitely large leading
to eﬀort levels converging to zero. Near the cases of perfect complements and perfect
substitutes, the equilibrium converges to special cases of the equilibria in Baik (2008)
and Lee (2008), respectively.
19The results give a coherent picture about the role of heterogeneity of groups sizes
and valuations between group members. However, it is clear that the the assumption
of a linear homogenous impact function combined with the assumption of a contest
success function that is homogenous of degree zero has greatly simpliﬁed the analysis.
We are nevertheless conﬁdent that our analysis provides some general insights into
the relevance of the degree of complementarity of group members’ eﬀorts for their
behavior in contests.
Appendix A: Proof of Lemma 1
Proof. We ﬁrst check that the interior solution is a local maximum. The ﬁrst-order





































Solving the ﬁrst-order condition for vk
i and inserting the expression into the second-


















which holds for all γ ∈ (−∞,1). Therefore, all solutions of the ﬁrst-order condition
are local maxima taking the other players’ strategies as given. The best responses are
either given by the solution to the ﬁrst-order condition, or by a corner solution. From
equation (1) it is clear that the only possible corner solutions are non-participation
with xk
i = 0. We thus need to verify that whenever the best response of one member
of the group is given by the solution to the ﬁrst-order condition, it is not possible
for any member of the group to have the best response xk
i = 0. First, we will show
that whenever there exists a solution of the ﬁrst-order condition for one individ-
ual of a group, it exists for all individuals: From the ﬁrst-order conditions of two
representative group members l, k we obtain the within-group equilibrium condition:















20for all members k,l of group i. Both, the left-hand side (LHS) and right-hand side
(RHS) of (A.4) are strictly increasing in yk
i , yl
i if γ ∈ (0,1). For γ ∈ (−∞,0) both
LHS and RHS of (A.4) are strictly decreasing in yk
i , yl
i. Thus, for each yk
i there
exists a yl
i such that the within-group equilibrium condition holds. Since for all
group members the LHS of (A.1) is equal, there exists a positive solution to the
ﬁrst-order condition (FOC) for either all group members or none.
Second, we need to show that xk
i = 0 is not a best response if it is a best response
for another individual l in the group to play xl
i > 0. We do so by contradiction:
Obviously, for a corner solution with xk
i = 0 and xl


























From the fact that there is an individual l in the group, which participates with
























































which is a contradiction for all γ < 1. Thus there does not exist an equilibrium
in which for one player in the group a corner solution at zero eﬀort investments is
obtained while for another an interior solution holds.
21Appendix B: Proof of Lemma 2
Proof. If there exists a solution to the FOC, it is characterized by the following
equation, obtained by solving (A.4) for yl



























γ > Q/i. Note that
this condition is the same for all members of a group. In all other cases, we get
yk
i = 0 for γ ∈ (0,1) and yk
i = ∞ for γ ∈ (−∞,0) as was to be expected and which
corresponds to xk
i = 0. In these cases we have ∀l : yk
i = yl
i by equation (A.4) and
by the deﬁnition of Qi, we have: Qi = Y
1
γ
i = 0. We can write a group best-response
function as







establishing part a), since by Lemma 1 either for all group members we obtain an
interior solution or for none. Since the best-response function is continuous in γ  = 0
and in the strategies of the other groups Q/i, if a unique Nash equilibrium exists,
the equilibrium strategies must also be continuous in γ. This establishes part c) of
Lemma 2. What remains to be shown is which groups participate in equilibrium.
Suppose a group ζ participates in equilibrium with strictly positive eﬀort, while a
group ζ + 1 does not participate. Let Q∗
i(γ) be Qi in equilibrium (we ignore here
that these are best responses and should thus be functions of Q∗
/i) and let the other
variables introduced above be deﬁned correspondingly in equilibrium. Then by the







Since by assumption Q∗
ζ+1(γ) = 0, we have Q∗
/ζ+1(γ) = Q∗(γ). Solving (7) for Q/i








22We now insert (B.5) into the ﬁrst equation of (B.4) and the condition ˆ Q/ζ+1 = ˆ Q





in equilibrium. It follows that Vζ(γ) > Vζ+1(γ). We can thus order the groups such
that Vi(γ) ≥ Vi+1(γ) and deﬁne n∗(γ) as the group with the highest index number
that still participates with strictly positive eﬀort. By (B.6), all groups i ≤ n∗(γ)
participate. This establishes part b) of Lemma 2.
Appendix C: Proof of Proposition 5













(1/γ)−1 = mi (C.1)
lim















∞, mi > 1
vk





























      
      
< 0, mi = minj(mj),mi < m2
= 0, m1 > mi ≥ mj,∀j
= 1/n∗, m1 = mi =     = mn∗
= 1, mi > m2 ≥ ...
(C.5)
Note that by the ﬁrst case all groups who do not have at least a group size
equal to the second largest group will not participate for a suﬃciently small γ. This
is because for γ decreasing towards 0, iteratively all groups with minimal size will
drop out of the contest. Thus, we have part a) of the proposition. For the case that
23there are n∗ − 1 participating groups of equal size strictly smaller than the largest
group, their winning probability converges to zero (and thus for the largest group
to one). For the case of n∗ equal groups with maximal size it approaches 1/n∗. This
establishes part e).
Suppose now we are at a γ small enough, such that only the groups with size
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. (C.6)













































   
   
n∗−1
n∗ mi   1/n∗   vk
i , m1 = m2 = mi =     = mn∗
1
mi   0   vk
i , m1 > m2 = mi =     = mn∗
0   1   vk




   
   
(n∗−1)vk
i
n∗2mi , m1 = m2 = mi =     = mn∗
0, m1 > m2 = mi =     = mn∗
0, mi > m2 ≥ ...
, (C.10)
which establishes part b).
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, m1 > m2 =     = mn∗ = 1
, (C.11)
which establishes part d) of the proposition.
24Appendix D: Proof of Proposition 6
Proof. The proof is in its structure almost identical to the one for Proposition 4 and
will thus not be stated here.8 Note that
lim




























0, mi > 1
v1
i, mi = 1
(D.3)
which explains intuitively, why the results are reversed such that groups with small
group sizes participate only and limγ→0− Q∗(γ) = 0.
8A complete proof can, of course, be obtained from the authors upon request.
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